Abstract. Justification Logics provide a framework for reasoning about justifications and evidences. Most of the accounts of justification logics are crisp in the sense that agent's justifications for a statement is convincing or is not. In this paper, we study fuzzy variants of justification logics, in which an agent can have a justification for a statement with a certainty degree between 0 and 1. We replaced the classical base of the justification logics with some known fuzzy logics: Hajek's basic logic, Lukasiewicz logic, Gödel logic, product logic, and rational Pavelka logic. In all of the resulting systems we introduced fuzzy models (fuzzy possible world semantics with crisp accessibility relation) for our systems, and established the soundness theorems. In the extension of rational Pavelka logic we also proved a graded-style completeness theorem.
Introduction
Justification logics is a family of logics used to reason about justifications and reasons for our belief or knowledge. Justification logics began with Artemov's logic of proofs [1, 2] , however various systems for justification logics have been introduced in the literature (see e.g. [3, 13] ). Justification logics are extensions of classical propositional logic by expressions of the form t : A, where A is a formula and t is a justification term. Regarding epistemic models of justification logics (cf. [7, 16] ), the formula t : A is interpreted as "t is a justification (or evidence) for A", and some of the justification logics also enjoy arithmetical interpretation of the operator ":", in which t : A can be read as "t is a proof of A in Peano arithmetic." Note that mathematical proofs are certain justifications for theorems. But in real life reasoning we often deal with uncertain justifications.
It seems the only work that addresses uncertain justifications for belief is Milnikel's logic of uncertain justifications [14] . He replaced the justification assertions t : A with t : r A, where r ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1], with the intended meaning "I have (at least) degreee r of confidence in the reliability of t as evidence for belief in A." Nevertheless, Milnikel's logic of uncertain justifications has (two-valued) classical propositional logic as its logical part. We think that the true logic of uncertain justifications should be based on fuzzy logics. fuzzy logics are well-known frameworks with the aim of inference under vagueness.
1
This paper tries to give a synthesis of justification logic and fuzzy logic (both systems are considered in the propositional level in this paper). We extended justification logic and fuzzy logic to fuzzy justification logic, a framework for reasoning on justifications under vagueness. We replaced the classical base of the justification logic with some known fuzzy logics: Hajek's basic logic, Lukasiewicz logic, Gödel logic, product logic, and rational Pavelka logic (cf. [10] ). In all of the resulting systems we introduced fuzzy models (fuzzy possible world semantics with crisp accessibility relation) for our systems, and established the soundness theorems. In the extension of rational Pavelka logic we also proved a graded-style completeness theorem.
Our systems are t-norm based, that means given an arbitrary t-norm all connectives have associated truth degreee functions which are defined from that t-norm (cf. [9] ). The language of fuzzy justification logics includes expressions of the form t : A, but with a different interpretation. The formula t : A can be interpreted as "t is an evidence for believing A with a certainty degree taken form the interval [0, 1] ." In other words, t may be an evidence for A that is not fully convincing and is only plausible to some extent. This allows us to reason about those facts that we do not have complete information or knowledge about them. Moreover, in fuzzy justification logics which are extensions of rational Pavelka logic (see Section 5) we are able to define justification assertions of the form t : r A, t :
r A, and t r : A that can be read respectively as "t is a justification for believing A with certainty degree at least r", "t is a justification for believing A with certainty degree at most r", and "t is a justification for believing A with certainty degree r."
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the axioms and rules of the basic justification logic, and its semantics. In Section 3, we review various t-norm based fuzzy logics. In Section 4, we introduce basic fuzzy justification logic and its fuzzy models. We also introduce Lukasiewicz, Gödel, and product justification logics and their models. In Section 5 we will develop a fuzzy justification logic whose language contains truth constants, and prove soundness and graded-style completeness theorems.
Basic justification logic
In this section, we recall the axiomatic formulation of basic justification logic J and its semantics. The language of J is an extension of the language of propositional logic by expressions of the form t : A, where A is a formula and t is a justification term. Justification terms are built up from justification variables 1 In this paper, we use the term fuzzy logic in the narrow sense distinguished by Zadeh in [20] (from the broad sense), namely fuzzy logic is a logical system which aims at a formalization of approximate reasoning.
x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . and justification constants c, c 1 , c 2 , . . . using binary operations '·' and '+'. More formally, justification terms and formulas of J are formed by the following grammar:
where p is a propositional variable and ⊥ is the truth constant falsity. The set of all propositional variables, all terms and all formulas of J are denoted respectively by P, T m, and F m J . Next we describe the axioms and rules of J.
Definition 1. Axiom schemes of J are:
PC. Finite set of axiom schemes for classical propositional calculus,
Rules of inference:
MP. Modus Ponens, from ⊢ A and ⊢ A → B, infer ⊢ B. IAN. Iterated Axiom Necessitation, ⊢ c in : c in−1 : . . . : c i1 : A, where A is an axiom instance of J, c ij 's are justification constants and n ≥ 1.
We now proceed to the definition of Constant Specifications. Let J CS be the fragment of J where the Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule only produces formulas from the given CS.
In the rest of this section we introduce Fitting models for J.
Definition 3. A Fitting model M = (W, R, E, V) for justification logic J CS (or an J CS -model for short) consists of a non-empty set of possible worlds W, an accessibility relation R which is a binary relation on W, i.e. R ⊆ W × W, a truth valuation V : W × P → {0, 1} and an admissible evidence function E : W × T m × F m J → {0, 1} meeting the following conditions (we use the notation E w (t, A) instead of E(w, t, A)):
The truth valuation V extends uniquely to all formulas, i.e. V : W × F m J → {0, 1}, as follows (we use the notation V w (A) instead of V(w, A)):
3. V w (t : A) = 1 iff E w (t, A) = 1 and for every v ∈ W with wRv, V v (A) = 1.
We say that a formula A is J CS -valid (denoted by J CS A) if for every J CS -model M = (W, R, E, V) and every w ∈ W we have V w (A) = 1.
The intended meaning of the admissible evidence function E is as follows: E w (t, A) = 1 means that t is an admissible justification for A in w. Thus condition V3 means: the formula t : A is true in a world w of a model M if and only if t is an admissible justification for A in w, and A is true in all w-accessible worlds.
The proof of the following theorem can be found in [3] .
Theorem 1. For a given constant specification CS, the basic justification logic J CS is sound and complete with respect to their J CS -models, i.e., J CS ⊢ A iff J CS A.
Among various papers on the justification logics, it seems the only work that addresses uncertain justifications for belief is Milnikel's logic of uncertain justifications J U (cf. [14] ). He replaced the justification assertions t : A with t : r A, where r ∈ Q∩(0, 1], with the intended meaning "I have (at least) degreee r of confidence in the reliability of t as evidence for belief in A." Milnikel considered the following principles:
along with the rule IAN with the conclusion: ⊢ c in :
Note that J U is based on the classical propositional logic. Although axioms and rules of Milnikel's logic is plausible, we think that the true logic of uncertain justifications is based on fuzzy logics. This is the approach we take in the following sections. Particularly, in Section 5 we will develop a fuzzy justification logic whose language contains truth constants, and show that all the principles of J U is valid in it.
T-norm based fuzzy logics
In this section we recall the Hajek's fuzzy basic logic BL from [10] .
2 Formulas of BL are built by the following grammar:
where p ∈ P, & is the strong conjunction, and0 is the truth constant for falsity. Further connectives are defined as follows:
2 For a more detailed exposition of other fuzzy logics consult [8] .
Definition 4. Axiom schemes of BL are:
Modus Ponens is the only inference rule.
We list here some theorems of BL that are useful in later sections (for proofs cf. [10] ).
Lemma 1.
The following are theorems of BL:
The definition of the classical valuations can easily be extended to a manyvalued realm. The standard set of truth degreees is the real interval [0, 1]. Now a truth valuation is a mapping V : P → [0, 1]. In order to define the truth functions of the strong conjunction & and implication → we need the notion of triangular norm (or t-norm). A binary operation * on the interval [0,1] is a t-norm if it is commutative, associative, non-decreasing and 1 is its unit element. 3. Product t-norm: x * P y = x · y It is well-known that (see eg. [10] ) each continuous t-norm is a combination of Lukasiewicz, Gödel and product t-norms (in a sense).
Definition 6.
A residuum ⇒ of a continuous t-norm * is defined as follows:
From the definition of residuum, for all x, y, z ∈ [0, 1], we have
As it is shown in [10] , for each continuous t-norm * and its residuum ⇒, the following holds:
Example 2. The residuum of continuous t-norms of Example 1 are the followings (where x, y ∈ [0, 1]):
1. Lukasiewicz implication:
Gödel implication:
x ⇒ G y = 1 , x ≤ y y , x > y 3. Product (or Goguen) implication:
Note that the only continuous implication of Example 2 is the Lukasiewicz implication.
The following lemma is useful in later sections (we leave it to the reader to verify the details of the proof).
Lemma 2. For all x, x
′ , y, y ′ ∈ [0, 1], we have:
Now suppose * is an arbitrary t-norm. One can construct a t-norm based 4 propositional calculus P C( * ) (in the same language of BL) and interpret the strong conjunction & and implication → as t-norm * and its residuum ⇒. Now a truth valuation V (relative to * ) recan be extended to all formulas as follows:
It can be shown that
Definition 7.
A formula A is a 1-tautology of P C( * ) iff V(A) = 1 for each truth valuation V of P C( * ). A formula A is a t-tautology iff V(A) = 1 for each truth valuation V and each continuous t-norm * .
It is shown in [10] that every theorem of BL is a t-tautology, the converse (completeness of BL) is shown in [5] . Thus BL is a common base of all the logics P C( * ).
Theorem 2. A formula F is provable in BL iff it is a t-tautology.
In the next definition, axiom systems of P C( * ) for t-norms of Example 1 are given (cf. [11] ). Definition 8. From the basic logic BL (in the same language of BL) one gets a complete axiomatization of:
1. the Lukasiewicz logic L if one adds the axiom scheme:
2. the Gödel logic G if one adds the axiom scheme
3. the product logic Π if one adds the axiom scheme
Note that Gödel logic G proves A&B ≡ A ∧ B. Further, G is an extension of intuitionistic logic by axiom BL6, or by the linearity axiom (
T-norm based justification logics
In this section we introduce t-norm based justification logics. First we consider the basic justification logic J on the bases of fuzzy basic logic BL (instead of classical propositional logic). We call the resulting system BLJ. Then by adding axioms L, G, and P from Definition 8 we obtain extensions of Lukasiewicz, Gödel and product logic.
The language of BLJ is an extension of the language of BL by justification assertions t : A, where justification term t is defined by the same grammar as in J. Thus, formulas of BLJ are built by the following grammar:
where p ∈ P, and t ∈ T m. Other connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, ≡, ↔ are defined as in Section 3. F m BLJ denotes the set of all formulas of BLJ.
BLJ are axiomatized by adding axiom schemes Appl and Sum (from Definition 1) to axiom schemes of BL (axioms BL1-BL7 from Definition 4). The rules of inference of BLJ are the same as those of J, i.e. MP and IAN (from Definition 1), with the difference that the axiom instance A in the Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule should be now an axiom instance of BLJ.
A constant specification CS for BLJ is a set of formulas of the form c in :
, where c ij 's are justification constants and A is an axiom instance of BLJ, such that it is downward closed. Let BLJ CS be the fragment of BLJ where the Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule only produces formulas from the given CS.
The definition of F-models for J can be easily extended to give models for BLJ, by replacing the set of truth values {0, 1} to [0, 1]. In fact, we define F-models for BLJ in such a way that the truth valuation V and admissible evidence function E in many-valued logic BLJ be a generalization of those in classical two-valued logic J.
Definition 10. Let * be a t-norm and ⇒ be its residuum. A structure M * = (W, R, E, V) (relative to * ) is a fuzzy Fitting model for BLJ CS (or simply is a BLJ CS -model), if W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, R is a (two-valued) accessibility relation on W, V is a truth valuation of propositional variables in each world V : W × P → [0, 1], and E is a fuzzy admissible evidence function
The truth valuation V extends uniquely to all formulas of BLJ as follows:
where
A formula A is BLJ CS -valid if V w (A) = 1, for every continuous t-norm * and every BLJ CS -model M * = (W, R, E, V) and every w ∈ W.
Note that conditions F E1 − F E3 in the above definition are generalizations of conditions E1 − E3 of Definition 3. The intended meaning of fuzzy admissible evidence function E is as follows: t is an admissible evidence for A in w with the certainty degree E w (t, A). Moreover, E w (t, A) = 1 means that t is an admissible evidence for A in w (as in the classical case). It seems that conditions F E1-F E3 are meaningful. For example, condition F E2 means that the certainty degree of t+s (or s+t) for A in w is greater or at least equal to that of t for A in w. In other words, if we strengthen a justification (or reason) of a fact by adding another justification, then the certainty degree of our justification will be increased.
The definition of V w indeed comes from the evaluation of modal formulas in many-valued modal logics with crisp accessibility relation (see e.g. [6, 19] )
Note that in many-valued modal logics it is not difficult to show that (see e.g. [19] )
for every world w. This shows that the modal axiom K, (A → B) → ( A → B), is valid in many-valued modal logics with crisp accessibility relation. It is shown in [4] that in general the axiom K is not valid in many-valued modal logics.
Next, we establish the soundness theorem for BLJ.
Proof. Assume that F is provable in BLJ CS . By induction on the proof of F we show that F is BLJ CS -valid. Let * be an arbitrary t-norm and M * = (W, R, E, V) be an arbitrary BLJ CS -model relative to * and w be an arbitrary world in W.
We have to show that V w (F ) = 1. First suppose that F is an axiom.
• By Theorem 2, all axioms of BL are t-tautologies. Thus, the result is known for axioms of BL.
B).
On the other hand, from (1) we have
Hence, by the properties of t-norms
Thus, by V4,
Hence, by the properties of t-norms 
⊓ ⊔
It remains open whether the converse of the above theorem, that is the completeness theorem, does hold. Let us now introduce Mkrtychev models (or M-models for short) for BLJ which are singleton fuzzy Fitting models.
Definition 11. Let * be a t-norm and ⇒ be its residuum. A structure M * = (E, V) (relative to * ) is a fuzzy M-model for
A formula A is BLJ CS -M-valid if V(A) = 1 for every continuous t-norm * and every
The soundness theorem of BLJ with respect to M-models is a consequence of Theorem 4.
Now let us define extensions of BLJ.
Definition 12. The following logics have the same language as BLJ.
1. LJ is obtained from BLJ by adding the axiom scheme L. 2. GJ is obtained from BLJ by adding the axiom scheme G. 3. ΠJ is obtained from BLJ by adding the axiom scheme P.
In the rest of this section let L denote either LJ, GJ, or ΠJ. Note that the axiom instance A in the Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule in L should be now an axiom instance of L. The definition of constant specifications CS for L and L CS are similar to those of J.
and every w ∈ W. Now soundness of LJ, GJ, and ΠJ with respect to their models can be obtained easily from Theorems 3 and 4.
M-models for LJ, GJ, and ΠJ can be defined similar to M-models of BLJ, and the soundness theorem also holds for M-validity.
Fuzzy justification logics with truth constants
In classical propositional logic the truth constants ⊤ (truth) and ⊥ (falsity) can be defined respectively by p ∨ ¬p and p ∧ ¬p, for some propositional variable p. But in many-valued logics (introduced in Section 4) we cannot define all truth values [0, 1] in our object language, and thus they may be added explicitly to the language. A well-known fuzzy logic with truth constants was introduced by Pavelka [18] (for a recent account of this logic see [17] ). Hajek [10] gives a simple formulation of this logic, called Rational Pavelka Logic RPL, in which rational numbers in [0, 1], as truth constants, are added to the language of Lukasiewicz logic L. In this section, we first recall RPL, and then extend it with justification assertions, and prove a soundness and a graded-style completeness theorem.
The language of RPL is an extension of the language of Lukasiewicz logic L by truth constantsr, for each rational number r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]. More precisely, formulas of RPL is constructed by the following grammar:
where p ∈ P and r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]. Formulas of the formr → A are called graded formulas. Axioms and rules of RPL is given by adding the following bookkeeping axiom schemes for truth constants to axioms and rules of L:
Since RPL ⊢1, we can conclude that RPL ⊢r →r ′ .
A truth valuation V of formulas of RPL is defined similar to that of L, with the following addition:
V(r) = r for any r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]. By this definition, it is obvious that a graded formulā r → A is true iff the truth value of A is at least r, i.e.
V(r → A) = 1 iff r ≤ V(A).
A truth valuation V of RPL is a model of a finite set of RPL-formulas T , if V(A) = 1 for all A ∈ T . The following strong completeness theorem for RPL is proved in [10] . Theorem 7. Let T be a finite set of RPL-formulas, and F be an RPL-formula. RPL ⊢ F iff F is true in every model of T . Now by adding justification assertions to RPL, we give a Pavelka based justification logic. We denote this system by RPLJ. Formulas of RPLJ are constructed by the following grammar:
where p ∈ P, r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1], and t ∈ T m (here T m is the same set of justification terms of basic justification logic J in Section 2). The connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, ≡, ↔ are defined as in BL.
Thanks to truth constants, the following useful operators can be defined in the language of RPLJ: -"t is a justification for believing A with certainty degree at least r", -"t is a justification for believing A with certainty degree at most r", -"t is a justification for believing A with certainty degree r." where A is an axiom instance of RPLJ, c ij 's are arbitrary justification constants and n ≥ 1.
Note that in contrast to the language of BLJ, in RPLJ we are able to express explicitly the certainty degree of a justification for a statement. Particularly, in BLJ for an axiom instance A, by rule IAN, we could deduce c : A, for some constant c, which means that c is an evidence for A with a certainty degree taken form the interval [0, 1]. But in RPLJ, we could deduce c For a constant specification CS, RPLJ CS is a fragment of RPLJ in which the rule GIAN only produces formulas from the given CS. For a set of formulas T , formula A and constant specification CS, we write T ⊢ CS A if A is derived from T in RPLJ CS .
Lemma 3. Given an arbitrary constant specification CS, the following statements are theorems of RPLJ CS . For all RPLJ-formulas A, all t ∈ T m, and all r, r ′ ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]:
Proof. 1. By Lemma 1 clause 2,1
Since1 is provable in RPLJ CS (Lemma 1 clause 1), by MP,
That is, t : 1 A. 2. t : 0 A is an instance of axiom BL7, i.e.0 → t : A.
Note that ¬t :
r A is an abbreviation of (t : A →r) →0. Now by axiom BL6,
or, in our notations, ¬t : r A → ¬¬t : r A. Then, by axiom L of Lukasiewicz logic and axiom BL1 using MP, we obtain ¬t : r A → t : r A. 4. Similar to clause 3. 5. As mentioned above, if r ≤ r ′ , then ⊢ CSr →r ′ , and therefore by axiom BL1 and MP, we obtain (r ′ → t : A) → (r → t : A).
That is, t : r ′ A → t : r A. 
is provable in RPLJ CS , from this by MP we infer1 → (t 1. Graded Modus Ponens:r
Justified Graded Modus Ponens:
Proof. The proof of clause 1 can be found in [10] . For clause 2, supposer → s :
is provable in RPLJ CS . Hence, from Lemma 1 clause 7 using MP,
From this and axiom TC2, it follows that r * L r ′ → (s : (A → B)&t : A).
Moreover, from axiom Appl and BL5a we deduce that
Therefore, r * L r ′ → s · t : B.
For clause 3, suppose that s : r A, i.e.r → s : A, is provable in in RPLJ CS . Now from this and axiom BL1, we obtainr → s + t : A, or s + t : r A.
⊓ ⊔
From rules JGMP, Mon 1 , and Mon 2 , it is immediately follows that the following rules are also admissible in RPLJ CS :
The following form of the Deduction Theorem holds in RPLJ. The proof is similar to that given in [10] for BL.
Lemma 5 (Deduction Theorem). T, A ⊢ CS B iff T ⊢ CS A
n → B for some n, where A n := A& . . . &A, n times.
Note that the ordinary deduction theorem, T, A ⊢ B iff T ⊢ A → B, only holds in Gödel justification logic GJ (for more details cf. [10] ).
Lemma 6 (Lifting Lemma). Given axiomatically appropriate constant specification
then there is a justification term t(x 1 , . . . , x n ), for variables x 1 , . . . , x n , such that
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation of F . We have two base cases:
-If F is an axiom, then there is a justification constant c such that c : F ∈ CS. Put t := c, and use IAN to obtain c
For the induction step we have two cases.
-Suppose F is obtained by Modus Ponens from G → F and G. By the induction hypothesis, there are terms u(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and v(x 1 , . . . , x n ) such that
and
Then put t := u.v, and use the rule JGMP ′ to obtain
which, by Lemma 3 clause 6, implies that
-Suppose F is obtained from the rule GIAN, so F = c in 
Definition 18. -For a RPLJ CS -model M = (W, R, E, V) and a set of formulas T , M is a model of T if V w (F ) = 1, for all formulas F ∈ T and all w ∈ W. -We say that a formula F is a semantic consequence of T in RPLJ CS , written
For a model M = (W, R, E, V) sometimes we write w ∈ M instead of w ∈ W.
The truth valuation of graded justification assertions are as follows:
Lemma 8. Let M be an arbitrary RPLJ CS -model and w ∈ M be an arbitrary world. Then, the following holds:
Proof. The proof of items 1 and 2 follows easily from (2) and (3). For item 3, we reason as follows:
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 8 (Soundness). For each set of formulas T , formula A and constant specification CS, if T ⊢ CS A then T |= CS A.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the proof of A. The case where A ∈ T is obvious. The case where A is an axiom or is obtained from MP is similar to the proof of Theorem 4 (in particular, it is easy to show that axioms TC1 and TC2 are RPLJ CS -valid).
Suppose F = c in 
Since A is an axiom, V u (A) = 1 for all u ∈ W. Thus, V v (c : A) = 1. Hence,
This completes the base case. The induction step is routine. Therefore, V w (c in Next we show that all principles of Milnikel's logic of uncertain justifications ( [14] ) are valid in RPLJ.
Lemma 9. Given an arbitrary constant specification CS, the following statements are RPLJ CS -valid:
Proof. Let M be an arbitrary RPLJ CS -model and w ∈ M be an arbitrary world.
1. From the proof of soundness theorem we have
.
That is
Hence,
Thus, V w (s : r (A → B) → (t : r ′ A → s · t : r * Lr ′ B)) = 1.
2. From F E2 we have E w (s, A) ≤ E w (t + s, A),
From these and properties of t-norms we obtain
Thus,
That are V w (s : r A) ≤ V w (t + s : r A),
3. By Lemma 3 (clause 5) and Theorem 8.
⊓ ⊔
Definition 19. Let T be a set of formulas, and A be a formula.
1. Truth degreee of A over T respecting CS is defined as follows:
|M is a RPLJ CS -model of T and w ∈ M}.
2. Provability degreee of A over T respecting CS is defined as follows:
The proof of the following lemmas are similar to that given in [10] (Lemmas 3.3.7 and 3.3.8).
Lemma 10. If S ⊢ CSr → A, then S ∪ {A →r} is CS-consistent.
Lemma 11. Let S be a CS-consistent and CS-complete set of formulas. The following properties hold:
Moreover, it can be shown that every CS-consistent set of formulas can be extended to a CS-consistent and CS-complete set.
Definition 21 (Canonical model). The canonical model
for RPLJ CS is defined as follows:
1. W c = {S|S is a CS-consistent and CS-complete set}.
3. E Therefore,
Proof. It suffices to show that E c satisfies conditions F E1 − F E3. Suppose S is an arbitrary world in W c .
-Condition F E1: let
It is easy to show that X ∩ Y ⊆ Z, and hence sup(X ∩ Y ) ≤ sup(Z). On the other hand, one can verify that X and Y have the following property: if r is in X (or Y ) and r
Since x * L y ≤ x, for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], we have
Since x * L y ≤ y, for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], we have Proof. Suppose T is a CS-consistent set of RPLJ-formulas. Then it can be extended to a CS-consistent and CS-complete set S. Now consider the canonical model Proof. Suppose A is a formula in the language of RPL, and it is provable in RPLJ CS . Now suppose that V is an arbitrary truth valuation of RPL. It suffices to show that V(A) = 1. Then by completeness of RPL (Theorem 7), RPL ⊢ A. Now I aim to construct an RPLJ CS -model from the valuation V of RPL. Let M = (W, R, E, V ′ ) be defined follows:
-E w0 (t, A) = 1, for all t ∈ T m and RPLJ-formula A.
, for all p ∈ P. Clearly, E satisfies the conditions F E1 − F E3, and thus M is an RPLJ CS -model. By induction on the complexity of A it can be easily shown that V(A) = V w0 (A). Since A is provable in RPLJ CS , then by Lemma 8, A is RPLJ CS -valid, that is V w (A) = 1 for every RPLJ CS -model M = (W, R, E, V) and every w ∈ W. Thus, V w0 (A) = 1, and hence V(A) = 1.
⊓ ⊔
In fact the model constructed in the above proof is a Mkrtychev model of RPLJ. Similar to M-models of BLJ we can define M-models for RPLJ. All the results of this section holds for these M-models too.
In classical justification logics axiom jT states that justifications are factive: every justified statement is true. Let us see how the addition of axiom jT to our fuzzy justification logics BLJ, LJ, GJ, ΠJ, and RPLJ affects matter (specially the proof of soundness theorems).
In the framework of fuzzy justification logic, at first sight it seems that axiom jT is unacceptable. For weak justifications (justifications with low certainty degree) for a statement, would not necessarily imply the truth of that statement. But note that in the framework of t-norm based fuzzy logics, validity of jT means that the truth value of t : A is less than or equal to the truth value of A, which holds in all fuzzy Fitting models that have a reflexive accessibility relation R. 7 The proof is as follows. Let M = (W, R, E, V) be an arbitrary fuzzy Fitting model, w ∈ W be an arbitrary world, and R be reflexive. Then By adding axiom jT to RPLJ, the followings are provable:
Instead of axiom jT, either of the above formulas can be added to our fuzzy justification logics. The last one is an instance of axiom jT, t :0 →0, and is called axiom jD. This axiom is acceptable if we want to axiomatize consistent belief (i.e. it is impossible to hold contradictory belief), or normative belief (in which the notion of "ought to believe" is concerned).
It is easy to see that jD is valid in those fuzzy Fitting models of LJ, GJ, ΠJ, or RPLJ that have a serial accessibility relation R. The proof is as follows. Let M = (W, R, E, V) be an arbitrary fuzzy Fitting model, w ∈ W be an arbitrary world, and R be serial. Then, V w (0) = inf{V v (0)|wRv} = 0.
Thus, V w (t :0) = 0. Note that in all logics LJ, GJ, ΠJ, and RPLJ we have that V w (¬A) = 1, whenever V w (A) = 0. Hence, V w (¬t :0) = 1.
We leave the study of adding other justification principles to our fuzzy systems for future work.
Conclusion
We extended fuzzy logic and justification logic to fuzzy justification logic, a framework for reasoning on justifications under vagueness. We replaced the classical base of the justification logic J with some known fuzzy logics: Hajek's basic logic, Lukasiewicz logic, Gödel logic, product logic, and rational Pavelka logic. In all of the resulting systems we introduced fuzzy models (fuzzy possible world semantics with crisp accessibility relation) for our systems, and established the soundness theorems. In the extension of rational Pavelka logic we also proved a graded-style completeness theorem.
This paper is the first study of fuzzy justification logics, and there are many directions for further work. The main problem remain open in this paper is the proof of the standard completeness theorem (i.e. if a formula is valid, then it is provable). Another direction for further research is to study fuzzy versions of Fitting models with soft accessibility relations R : W × W → [0, 1]. Kripke models of this kind have been studied in the literature for fuzzy modal logics, initiating from the work of Fitting [6] . The relationships between our fuzzy versions of J and fuzzy versions of modal logic K is also interesting (the realization theorem).
